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Abstract
We use available methods for testing macro models to evaluate a model
of China over the period from Deng Xiaopings reforms up until the crisis
period. Bayesian ranking methods are heavily inuenced by controversial
priors on the degree of price/wage rigidity. When the overall models are
tested by Likelihood or Indirect Inference methods, the New Keynesian
model is rejected in favour of one with a fair-sized competitive product
market sector. This model behaves quite a lot more exibly than the
New Keynesian.
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There is much work on how China has developed and achieved rapid growth
in the past three decades. There is also much commentary on the day-to-day
behaviour of the Chinese economy, and some e¤orts to model this behaviour.
There is also a body of work modelling the Chinese economys business cycle
behaviour as a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, in the
manner applied to major developed economies. Even though China is at an
earlier stage of development than these, a DSGE model does not appear to
make assumptions that restrict its application to countries at earlier stages,
provided these economies have normal market structures. Since such market
structures have evolved rapidly since the end of the 1970s (Coase and Wang,
2012), there seems to be every reason to expect that a DSGE model could
explain the business cycle behaviour of China in the past three decades.
In an earlier version of this paper, Dai (2012) examined this work and con-
sidered whether a DSGE model that has been successfully applied to the US (Le
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et al, 2011; Smets and Wouters, 2007) could be used successfully to model the
behaviour of China over the period since Deng Xiaopings reforms. The model,
that of Smets and Wouters following Christiano et al (2005), is only suitable
for a large continental economy since it assumes a closed economy. It might
be thought that since China has a large export and import sector, it cannot
be modelled as a closed economy. However, Chinas export and import sector
has developed rapidly as a result of decisions to invest in new infrastructure in
cities and transportation; once these decisions were taken, the resulting output
of goods was sold on world markets at the prices needed to absorb it. This
suggests that neither world demand nor the exchange rate would have much
e¤ect as prices would be adjusted to ensure available goods were sold. Because
the industrial structure is largely dominated by multi-national companies, im-
ports too are closely related to export volumes. Thus we would argue that
net imports can reasonably be modelled as exogenous processes in China, with
little connection to domestic business cycle uctuations; this is how they en-
ter in the Smets-Wouters model, as an exogenous error process in the goods
market-clearing equation whereby output equals demand for goods.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it exemplies a new method-
ology in which we use all available state-of-the-art methods of estimation and
testing to examine the claims of the model on this Chinese data. Specically we
estimate and test the model by Bayesian, FIML and Indirect Inference proce-
dures, to see what information these methods together can shed on the models
ability to match the data. The example here, which to our knowledge is the rst
empirical application, joins a growing body of work examining these methods
in a comparative way (e.g. Meenagh et al, 2014), some results from which we
cite in this paper.
Secondly, it uses a quarterly data set covering the full period since Deng
Xiaoping began his reform programme. Only annual data has been published
from o¢cial sources. Through private contacts with o¢cial networks we have
been able to gather the quarterly data we use and which we show here in l-
tered form. Comparison between the annual data we have and similarly ltered
published annual data shows a close t. Therefore we feel reasonably condent
in presenting the results here based uniquely on quarterly data.
To give an overview of our results here, we begin in a now-standard way
with Bayesian estimation, on the basis of a set of New Keynesian priors used by
Smets and Wouters for the US. We then consider how an alternative set of priors
that allow for part of the economy to be competitive (a Hybrid set-up that Le
et al, 2011, found to be extremely helpful in accounting for US macro behaviour)
a¤ects our Bayesian estimates and the ranking of New Keynesian versus Hybrid
models of China. We then go on to test how well each of these models, as
estimated by Bayesian ML, match the dynamics and volatility behaviour of
the data- an indirect inference test; we know from Monte Carlo experiments
carried out by Le et al (2011, 2012) that this method of indirect inference
has considerable power in testing model specication. This is a di¤erent and
more powerful criterion than the models likelihood which we also compute
and which checks whether the model can closely forecast the data- apparently
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mis-specied models can also forecast data well by respecifying error processes.
Having carried out these tests we nd a set of parameters that are best able to
satisfy the Indirect Inference test criterion; we regard this set as providing us
with a credible model- unfortunately available macro theory and evidence is
not able on its own yet to provide strongly based priors, as might be the case in
some natural sciences. We then compare the test results and estimates under
these di¤erent approaches. Our empirical results for China are similar to those
of Le et al (2014) who have since applied an extension of Dais (2012) model with
a banking sector for a more recent period spanning the nancial crisis. We nd
that the model can explain the behaviour of the main macroeconomic variables,
GDP, ination and interest rates. Like the same model for the US, it is less
able to explain the ner detail of economic behaviour, including consumption
and investment. However, this is a less vital task for a macro model than the
primary one of explaining broad macro behaviour. Our nal assessment is that
China is best explained by the hybrid model.
In the rest of this paper, we begin by setting out the model in its New
Keynesian form and explain the Hybrid generalisation. In the second section,
we explain our methods. In the third section, we set out the empirical results
for the models. In the fourth we review the preferred Hybrid models properties
and how they di¤er from the New Keynesian. Our nal section concludes.
1 The Model
There is a continuum of rms producing intermediate goods, households, and
a monetary as well as scal authority. The nal good Yt is a composite made
up of a continuum of intermediate goods Yt (i); these intermediate producers
operate in imperfectly competitive markets and set their prices with a mark-up
over costs reecting this; however they are not free to reset prices every period
but face an exogenous probability (as in Calvo, 1983) that they can reset them
in any given period. Final goods producers buy the intermediate goods on the
market and package for Yt resale to consumers, investors and the government in
a perfectly competitive market. Households buy these goods for consumption
subject to external habit persistence; and they supply labour via unions at a
wage that reects the unions imperfectly competitive monopoly power, again
with a Calvo probability of being able to reset the wage in any given period.
Households also invest in capital goods, subject to adjustment costs, as investors
on behalf of the intermediate goods rms that they own. The rms hire labour
and use capital to maximise prots on behalf of their owners. The model set-up
follows that of Smets and Wouters (2007) and we do not repeat it here.
The model is used in practice in a form log-linearised around its steady state
growth trend with the resulting equations set out in what follows.
The log-linearised aggregate resource constraint is:
yt = (1 GY   IY ) ct + IY  it +R
k
KY  zt + "
g
t
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where GY , IY , KY and R
k
 are steady state ratios, while "
g
t is the exogenous
spending shock, including government expenditure and export uctuations.
The consumption Euler equation is given by:
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The investment Euler equation is given by:
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The corresponding arbitrage equation for the shadow value of capital is:
qt = 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On the supply side of the nal goods market, the aggregate production
function is:
yt = p ( kt + (1  ) lt + "
a
t )
where the current capital stock used in production (kt) is a function of capital
installed in the previous period and the degree of capital utilisation (zt):
kt = kt 1 + zt
Furthermore, the optimisation behaviour of households implies that:
zt =
1   
 
 rkt
and the law of motion for installed capital is:
kt =
1  
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In the intermediate goods market, the price mark-up (pt ) is the di¤erence
between the marginal product of labour and the real wage (wt):
pt = mplt   wt =  (kt   lt) + "
a
t   wt
The New Keynesian Phillips curve with Indexed Calvo is:
t =
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1 + 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1 c
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 
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t
Cost minimisation implies the negative relationship between marginal costs
of capital and labour:
rkt =   (kt   lt) + wt
Similarly, in the monopolistic labour market, the real wage mark-up (wt ) is:
wt = wt  mrst = wt  

llt +
1
1  h=

ct  
h

ct 1

The real wage setting equation also follows Calvo with partial indexation:
wt =
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Finally, monetary policy is modelled by an empirical reaction function, or
Taylor rule1 :
rt = rt 1 + (1  ) (rt + ryyt) + ry (yt   yt 1) + "
r
t
In our procedures here which employ HP-detrended data yt is the deviation
of output from the HP trend.
As we will show below the New Keynesian version of the Smets and Wouters
model cannot match the Chinese macro data. The reason essentially is that the
model generates too little nominal variation. Other work too has found that the
single sector Calvo price- and wage-setting behaviour captures the data poorly
(Le et al, 2011). Also, as shown in Alvarez (2008), the microdata evidence is at
odds with the New Keynesian model. One possible answer to these problems
1We also considered the now standard developed country forward-looking rule and found
that both models were rejected strongly under this formsee Appendix 2.
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would be to allow heterogeneous price setting behaviour across a large number
of sectors with di¤erent behaviour, on a spectrum between highly competitive
and highly rigid, as in Dixon and Kara (2012) and Zhou (2012); Dixon (2010)
has shown that this approximates more realistic generalised rigidity set-ups
of both the Taylor and Calvo varieties. However, this approach substantially
enlarges and complicates the model. Instead, we propose here, following Le et
al (2011) for the US, a two-sector (hybrid) set-up, with one sector competitive
and the other sector Calvo; this special case, with only two sectors, is thus
an approximation to the full heterogeneous set-up and has proved empirically
highly successful in both the US and this Chinese context.
We assume that the wage and price setters supply labour and intermediate
goods partly in a competitive market in which prices and wages are exible and
partly in a market with imperfect competition. We also assume that the size of
each sector is determined by the facts of competition and will not be changed
in our sample. However, the degree of imperfect competition is allowed to di¤er
between labour and product markets. The general idea behind these assump-
tions is that there are some product sectors of economies where rigidity prevails
and also other sectors in which prices are exible; essentially this reects the de-
gree of competition in these sectors. Similarly, we can apply these assumptions
to labour markets to make some markets much more competitive than others.
An economy could contain more or less exibility in prices and wages due to
the level of competition within the economy. Thus we can think of the economy
as a weighted average of New Keynesian and New Classical behaviour. A nal
assumption is that a Taylor Rule that reects the properties of the hybrid model
must be pursued by the monetary authority.
Formally, to model the price and wage setting for the hybrid model we
assume that rms that produce intermediate goods have a production function
that combines a xed proportion of labour in imperfect competition with labour
from competitive markets, so the labour used by intermediate producers is:
lt = l1t + l2t =
(Z 1
0
(l1it)
1
1+w;t di
1+w;t
+
Z 1
0
l2itdi
)
where l1it is the imperfect competitive labour and l2it is the competitive
labour provided by the ith household at time t. To make things more clear, we
can imagine that lt represents the activities of an intermediary labour bundler.
Note that l1t = !wlt, where !w is the share of total labour that is in the
imperfectly competitive market, so
l2t = (1  !w) lt
and then
Wt = !wW1t + (1  !w)W2t
Every household utility contains the two sorts of labour in the same way, that
is:
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Uit = ::: 
l1+n1it "1nt
1 + n
 
l1+n2it "2nt
1 + n
:::
Now W1t is set according to the Calvo wage-setting equation and W2t is set
equal to the current expected marginal disutility of work. In the latter case,
there is a one quarter information lag for current ination, but this is ignored as
usual for convenience as it is unimportant in the Calvo setting over the whole
future horizon. The labour bundler has these wages in hand and o¤ers a labour
unit as above this weighted average wage, and then rms buy these labour units
for use in production.
By the same logic, retail output is made up of a xed proportion of inter-
mediate goods in an imperfectly competitive market and intermediate goods
bought from an imperfectly competitive market. The retail output is:
yt = y1t + y2t =
(Z 1
0
(yj1t)
1
1+p;t dj
1+p;t
+
Z 1
0
yj2tdj
)
The intermediate producers set the prices for y1t according to the Calvo
mark-up equation on marginal costs and set the prices for y2t at marginal costs.
Note that y1t = !pyt, in which !p is the share of the imperfectly competitive
goods market; so
y2t = (1  !p) yt
and
Pt = !pP1t + (1  !p)P2t
The retailers in the economy then combine these goods as above in a bundle
that they sell at this weighted average price.
Apart from these equations mentioned above the rst order conditions of
households and rms will not be changed no matter what markets they operate
in.
The initial sector weights used in estimation of the Hybrid model are !w =
0:5 (the New Keynesian share for wages) and !p = 0:5 (the New Keynesian
share for prices). That is, 50% of the labour market and 50% of product market
are imperfectly competitive. The hybrid model however still requires a large
amount of nominal rigidity to match the data, especially in the labour market.
This reects the reality in China in which even after the economic reforms of
1978 there are still large parts of the product and labour markets with imperfect
competition.
2 Estimation and Testing
2.1 The Bayesian Approach
We begin by discussing the Bayesian approach with which we begin our es-
timation processes. The approach estimates a model by Bayesian Maximum
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Likelihood where log total Likelihood = Sum (log data Likelihood as in FIML)
+ (log Likelihood of the estimated parameters according to their prior distribu-
tion). The latter likelihood falls as the distance of the estimates from the priors
increases. The approach then ranks models by their relative likelihood. If a at
(uninformative, uniformly distributed) prior is used, then the approach simply
becomes FIML; note that when users iterate on their priors, continuously using
the latest posterior as the prior for the next estimation iteration, this will also
converge on FIML.
The process is illustrated in the Figure 1 below. There is a universe of
all possible samples, the population Universe. Within this the Hypothesis H
has a probability of generating data as shown; this is the prior probability of
H, known from other previous work. We also observe data for this sample E.
Finally there is a joint occurrence of E and H, i.e. the extent to which H is
consistent with E (could be generating E) in this sample.
Figure 1: Illustration of Bayesian Inference
Bayes Theorem uses the equation E\H
POP
= E\H
E
 E
POP
= E\H
H
 H
POP
; or
equivalently P (H jE )P (E) = P (E jH )P (H) and recasts it to nd the posterior
probability of H given the evidence in this sample: P (H jE ) = P (EjH )P (H)
P (E) .
This posterior probability of H (i.e. conditional on the Evidence) is equal to
the chances of observing the evidence if H is true times (prior) chances of H
as a share of the total chances of observing the evidence.
The idea here is that the prior on H comes from previous well-founded
knowledge on general chances of observing H. We then distinguish this general
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chance of observing H (in all episodes) from the chances of H being observed
in this particular episode (posterior). These probabilities of H are both true; a
genuine prior based on wide previous knowledge is never superseded. Indeed it
is obvious from the Bayesian estimate that the posterior relies on the continued
validity of the prior. One may think of the police inspector guring out the
probability that Jack the Ripper is responsible for a newly found murder victim;
there is a general (prior) probability that Jack the Ripper is the murderer, and
then the evidence in this particular murder is used to assess the (posterior)
probability that he is the murderer of this victim.
As noted above, when a prior is merely an initial iteration but not based on
any previous knowledge, and is being treated as at or uninformative, only
in this case will the posterior be una¤ected by it and will simply be the FIML
estimate; here an equivalent way of thinking about the process is as continuously
updating the prior by the posterior and thus converging on FIML.
To assess P (H jE ), the procedure begins with P (E jH ): a modern Bayesian
estimation programme such as Dynare simulates H many times to see how often
you get E. To obtain P (E) = P (E jH1 )P (H1) + P (E jH2 )P (H2) + ::: one
may simulate all possible hypotheses that could be generating E: so P (E) is a
probability-weighted average of all the ways E could be generated. This step
can be bypassed if one is only interested in a relative probability of two or more
models. Modern computers can do these huge simulation jobs extremely quickly,
which accounts for the practical emergence of Bayesian methods in applied work.
However to establish P (H jE ) there is still the key missing element P (H)
which must be supplied by prior knowledge. Without it the Bayesian approach
can get no further than standard FIML and estimate/maximise P (E jH ):
The priors are thus assumed to reect knowledge in the scientic community.
Researchers adopt this communal knowledge, use it to assess this new episode;
and thus build up this knowledge for future research.
Yet, embarrassingly, we must be honest and admit that applied macroeco-
nomics does not really have any such knowledge. This is evidenced by the
numerous reversals of accepted macro understanding that have occurred during
modern history including: the Great Depression, the Great Ination, the Great
Moderation, and latterly the Great Recession. Each time known models have
been found wanting by a series of revolutionaries such Keynes and Friedman.
P (H) in e¤ect has constantly been questioned and has been and still is the
object of serious scientic controversy. This status of controversy attaching to
proposed priors in macroeconomics should therefore put us on our guard when
such priors are used to evaluate the relative probability of two hypotheses which
may themselves be suggested by di¤erent priors. For example, New Keynesians
will no doubt propose New Keynesian priors while those who argue that nominal
rigidity is not particularly important will tend to propose Hybrid priors.
In the Bayesian approach rival hypotheses are ranked by their relative poste-
rior probability: P (H1jE )
P (H2jE )
= P (EjH1 )P (H1)
P (EjH2 )P (H2)
. As is plain the priors are important
in this ranking since the relative prior probability of the two Hypotheses under
comparison, H1 and H2, is a component of the ratio. Thus the log relative
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posterior probability = (log of likelihood of data under H1 minus that under
H2) + log of Prior likelihood of H1 minus that of H2. The possible situation is
illustrated in the Figure 2 that follows.
Figure 2: Illustration of Inuences of Di¤erent Priors
In this illustration we see that there are two rival priors 0NK and 
0
HY ,
respectively New Keynesian and Hybrid priors. The model parameters under
examination are ranged along a spectrum of distance between these two extreme
views (measuring this distance could be done in terms of the Wald statistic
implied by a model with parameters calibrated either with NK or HY priors).
The red curve shows how the data likelihood varies along this spectrum, reaching
its maximum at bML. The prior likelihood of the parameters when 0NK is the
prior is shown by the thick black curve, while that when 0HY is the prior is shown
by the dotted black curve. The Bayesian ML estimate in each case is shown
respectively as bBNK and bBHY . We may note two things about this illustration:
the Bayesian estimates are biased strongly towards the priors and the posterior
likelihood ranking is dominated by the priors. Thus with NK priors the NK
model is ranked ahead, while with HY priors the HY model is ranked ahead.
This comes about in our illustration because the competing priors are strong
and far apart while the likelihood function of the data is rather at. This situa-
tion is, we suggest, fairly common in applied macroeconomics; Canova and Sala
(2009) suggested that data likelihood functions of macro model parameters were
fairly at, while priors strongly held by di¤erent parts of the macro profession
clearly di¤er substantially. We will see below that this situation applies in our
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case of China since the 1970s. Meanwhile we consider methods by which we
could test such rival models (including the original priors) objectively, i.e. when
prior information cannot be considered to be objectively known as is assumed
in the Bayesian approach. The full Bayesian approach, assisted by such prior
knowledge, may have to be deferred until a body of objective knowledge, based
on the rejection of poor models, can be built up. We now turn to methods for
achieving testing and rejection and through it knowledge-building.
2.2 Methods for Testing Model Structures
A key test of a model is whether it is consistent with the dynamics and volatility
found in the data and it is this testing approach that we pursue with respect to
the models here. There is a large literature in macroeconomics that compares
model simulations with stylised facts. We preserve the spirit of that literature
here but we implement it using a test that is statistically based on indirect
inference- Le et al (2010) review this transition. To summarise the stylised
facts we estimate a VAR on the data and retrieve its coe¢cients and the data
variances; the stylised facts (including the impulse response functions) often
used are derived from such a VAR and these variances. Our Wald test statistic is
based on the joint distribution of these elements. The model is initially adapted
from the Smets and Wouters model, and is then respecied and reestimated
through indirect inference in a manner set out later.
The estimation of a macroeconomic model by indirect inference involves
several steps (Smith, 1993, Gregory and Smith, 1991, 1993, Gourieroux et al.,
1993, Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995 and Canova, 2005).
First, suppose that yt is an m1 vector of actual observed data and xt () is
anm1 vector of simulated time series generated from the structural macroeco-
nomic model and that  is a k1 vector of the parameters of the macroeconomic
model and both the actual and simulated data are assumed to be stationary and
ergodic. The auxiliary model is f (yt; ), where  is a vector of parameters of
the auxiliary model. The estimation of indirect inference is that a particular
value of  exists given by 0 such that
f (xt (0) ; ) = f (yt; )
The maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters of the model based
on actual and simulated data are
f (xt (0) ; ) = f (yt; )
and
S = argmax S (yt; )
Then, the simulated quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of  is
T;S = argmax T (yt; S ())
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This is the value of  that produces parameter values of the auxiliary model
that maximise the likelihood function using the actual data. We can use the
extended method of simulated moments estimator (EMSME) as an alterna-
tive to the simulated quasi-maximum likelihood estimator; this can be ob-
tained as follows. Consider the continuous p 1 vector of functions g (T ) and
g (S ()) which could be moments or scores, for examples g () could be im-
pulse response functions, then let GT (T ) =
1
T
PT
t=1 g (T ) and GS (S ()) =
1
S
PS
s=1 g (S ()). And there is a requirement that T ! S in probability and
that GT (T )! GS (S ()) in probability for each . Then the EMSME is:
T;S = argmin[GT (T ) GS(S())]
0
W ()[G(T ) GS(S())]
 is thus being chosen to minimise [GT (T ) GS(S())]
0
W ()[G(T ) GS(S())]
which is the Wald test statistic for the chosen descriptors g () for any given
:The resulting estimator of  is consistent and asymptotically normal.
The Wald test statistic for a particular ^ is based on the distribution of
GT (T ) GS(S(^)) and can be written as
[GT (T ) GS(S(^))]
0
W [GT (T ) GS(S(^))]
where the estimate of the optimal weighting matrix is the inverse of the variance-
covariance matrix of the descriptors as simulated by the model:
W (^) =
(
[
@G((^))
@
](^)[
@G((^))
@
]
0
) 1
We obtain the distribution of GT (T )   GS(S(^)) and the Wald statistic
through bootstrapping the implied model errors (these can be extracted by the
LIML methods proposed by McCallum, 1976, and Wickens, 1982; and also by
full information methods using the expectations generated by the model). The
optimal values of ^ can in practice most easily be obtained by using a global
optimization algorithm such as Simulated Annealing (e.g. Ingber, 1996) and
Direct Search (also called pattern search, e.g. Kolda et al, 2006).
The procedure of performing the Wald test by bootstrapping can be sum-
marised as follows. First, estimate the errors of the economic model conditional
on the observed data and ^. Then estimate the empirical distribution of the
structural errors. The structural errors give the empirical distribution of the
f"tg
T
t=1 errors that are omitted in the null hypothesis. The simulated distur-
bances are drawn from these structural errors. We draw these disturbances from
a time vector to preserve the simultaneity between them. Finally, we compute
the Wald statistic.
In addition to the basic Wald statistic, a number of related Wald statistics
are considered. We refer to the Wald test based on the full joint distribution
of the VAR coe¢cients as implied by their full covariance matrix as the full
Wald test. This Wald test checks whether the coe¢cients based on the VAR
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data lie within the DSGE models implied joint distribution and is a test of the
DSGE models specication. The Mahalanobis distance based on the same joint
distribution is used to measure the overall closeness between the model and the
data and is normalised as a t-statistic.
We also want to check on the specic features of the macroeconomic model,
for example, how well the model can reproduce the behaviour of Chinese GDP
and ination. This can be done using a Wald statistic based on the VAR
equation for these two variables alone. This type of Wald test is referred to as
a Directed Wald statistic that can be used to evaluate how well a particular
variable or limited set of variables is modelled. The Directed Wald test can
also be used to determine how well the structural model captures the e¤ects
of a particular set of shocks. This requires creating a joint distribution of the
impulse response functions for the particular set of shocks and calculating a
Wald statistic for this distribution. Even if a macroeconomic model is rejected
by the indirect inference test, the Directed Wald test can still evaluate whether
the model is well-specied enough to deal with specic aspects of economic
behaviour.
Traditional statistics are also useful in this test, such as the ability to match
data variances, cross-correlations, and VAR-based Impulse Response Functions.
The cross-correlations and the Impulse Response Functions are all derived from
the VAR coe¢cients, so we focus on these coe¢cients alone, while the data
variances are included among the elements included in the Wald statistic.
3 Estimating and Testing the DSGE Model of
China
3.1 The Data
We apply our procedures for the period after the Economic reform of China in
1978, up to 2007. In this paper we decided not to use the raw, nonstationary
data but rather to apply the widely-used Hodrick-Prescott lter to make it
stationary. More recently Meenagh et al (2012) have developed methods to
carry out Indirect Inference on non-stationary data; and the Bayesian approach
can also be applied to such data. Le et al (2014) used Indirect Inference on the
raw data from the early 1990s and this proved helpful in analysing the recent
crisis. However, it seems that those results are not at variance with the ones
here in a general way. So the use of HP detrending does not seem to have
distorted our results here.
To achieve stationarity it was necessary to lter the data by more than
simple linear detrending, the least intrusive method. The unit root tests revealed
substantial evidence of trend non-stationarity and we therefore applied the HP
lter.2 The stationarised series are graphed in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
A natural question that arises from our use of unpublished quarterly data
2The ADF tests show that all the series after HP lter are stationary.
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Figure 3: HP-ltered Output, Ination and Interest Rate
Figure 4: HP-ltered Consumption, Investment, Employment and Wage
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is how far it matches the only available o¢cial data for our sample period,
which is annual, apart from interest rates where we use the o¢cial data as it
is quarterly. We show below annual HP-ltered o¢cial data for nominal GDP,
ination, real wages, nominal investment and nominal consumption. The rst
two of these are extremely close; these two series and interest rates are the three
key macro variables which we use to test the model against. In the last three
cases the unpublished data that we use is more variable than the o¢cial data
but the cyclical timing is similar. If the published data is correct then the error
processes on consumption and investment would be higher and those on net
exports plus government spending (our exogenous demand error) smaller than
the data we have used has implied. It is unlikely that such switching between
error processes would much a¤ect our test and estimation results; we checked
our results and found that indeed they were robust3 .
3.2 Indirect InferenceTests and Reestimation
We now proceeded to test the model using this data. The descriptors we chose
for the Wald statistic were the coe¢cients of a VAR(1) on the three key macro
variables, output, ination and interest rates, with in addition the variances of
each of these, giving a vector of 12 descriptors in all. If we include the coe¢cients
of a higher order VAR or of a VAR with more variables, such as consumption
and investment, we nd that for China, as for the US, the model is rejected for
reasons identied by Le et al (2011), namely that the description of the data
is a much ner one. Essentially, provided we try to match a description of the
data that is broad-grained and conned to key variables only, the model can
match the data but not if this neness of the match is raised.
Method Measure NK HY Dominant
Bayesian (prior = NK) Log Posterior -1141.1 -1448.9 NK
Bayesian (prior = HY) Log Posterior -917.2 -897.7 HY
ML (prior = at) Log Likelihood 744.035 752.438 HY
II estimated models Wald (P-Value) 19.61 (7%) 13.85 (31%) HY
Table 1: Test Results of the Two Models
In Table 1, we compare the three available tests of DSGE modelsBayesian,
Indirect Inference and Maximum Likelihood. Starting with the Bayesian method,
we consider two priors, NK and HY, both of them listed in Table 4; the NK
prior is taken from the Smets-Wouters US estimates and the HY prior from
some early II estimates for China together with the assumption that half the
economy is competitive. The Log Posterior of NK outperforms that of HY, if
we use the NK prior. If on the other hand we use the HY prior, the ranking
3 If we alter our error processes as indicated, the Wald statistic of the NK model is 18.87 (p-
value = 0.09) and that of the HY model is 12.33 (p-value = 0.42). The results are essentially
no di¤erent from those obtained under our datawhich are respectively 19.61 (p-value = 0.07)
and 13.85 (p-value = 0.31) as in Table 1.
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is reversed. It follows that the Bayesian ranking is crucially dependent on the
priors chosen, in the manner illustrated in Figure 2 above.
If we turn to the other tests in which priors have no inuence (thus in terms
of our earlier discussion they assess P (E jH ), or p-values of the models), we
nd that the HY dominates in all cases. Under the II test (once the models
are reestimated by II), HY has a signicantly higher p-value (0.31) compared
with NK, which is marginally accepted with a p-value of 0.07. The Likelihood
ratio test after FIML estimation also suggests that the unrestricted HY model
is preferred to the restricted NK model. The LR statistic (2 distribution) can
be calculated as 16.8 and the p-value of accepting the NK model is 0.0002.
What in short we see from these tests is that only if one has a strong NK
prior does one favour the NK model, with its assumption that there are no com-
petitive sectors in either the product or labour markets. The Chinese evidence
alone supports a model in which there is a substantial competitive sector in the
product market and only a small one in the labour market. The estimates from
the two models are set out in Tables 2 and 4, as well as the simulated values
they produce for our data features- Table 3. We also show below the shocks
and innovations from the two models in chart form- Figures 7 and 8.
What we see in the estimated structural parameters is that HY di¤ers from
NK in three key ways:
1) prices are almost entirely competitive which implies they simply track
current marginal costs instead of reecting the whole future of marginal costs
as in NK. The result is that ination responds less to long-lasting shocks in
marginal costs. We also nd that this is associated with a lower variance of the
prices shock; this in turn seems to be connected with the smaller variance of the
consumption shock since expected future ination(which a¤ects consumption
via the Euler equation) also is dampened.
2) the Taylor Rule responds to ination with a coe¢cient only just above
unity in HY, roughly half the NK response. This further reduces the economys
response to shocks via the ination/monetary policy transmission mechanism.
3) the elasticity of capacity utilisation is again roughly halved in HY com-
pared to NK. This implies that when the marginal product of capital (so prof-
itability and Q) rises capacity is brought into action more cheaply under HY
(and as Q falls it is mothballed more eaily). Hence investment reacts less to Q.
This can be thought of as a diminished accelerator mechanism in the model.
When we turn to the e¤ects of these di¤erences on the simulated stylised
facts or data features, we nd that there is little di¤erence in the means or
bounds of either model except for the variances. Both models are in fact easily
accepted on the dynamics alone (ie see the p-values on the VAR coe¢cients).
Both are rejected on the variances alone (the worst is output) but HY gets
much closer to these than NK, which is strongly rejected whereas NK is at least
not rejected at 99% condence. This better matching of variability by HY is
connected to the smaller shocks and weaker transmission mechanisms in 1)-3).
The shocks and innovations to the structural model shown here reect the
history of reform in China, on both the supply side of the economy and in
the management of demand. On the supply side the state has moved from
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state ownership to market forces. On the demand side monetary policy has
been increasingly liberalised and the banks freed of direct state control, while
local governments have become large independent agents in a federal budget
system. To take just two examples which can be identied in these graphs,
in 1992Q1 (quarter 53), Deng Xiaopings speeches in the south of China on
the need to reinforce the liberalisation programme contributes a clearly strong
positive movement to every one of the shocks to the model. When China joined
the WTO in 2001Q4 (quarter 100) this gave a further large poistive impulse
across all these shocks.
Innovations NK HY
a productivity 0.658 0.622
b consumption/preference 1.513 0.768
g government expenditure 0.513 0.462
i investment 0.223 0.218
r monetary policy 0.093 0.091
p price mark-up 0.346 0.079
w wage mark-up 0.429 0.441
Table 2: II-Estimated Standard Deviations of Innovations
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Figure 5: Comparison between the Internal GDP and O¢cial GDP (HP-ltered)
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Figure 6: Comparison between the Internal Data and O¢cial Data (Annualised and HP-ltered)
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Equation Regressor Data NK HY
5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95%
yt 1 0.933 0.885 0.957 1.006 IN 0.875 0.956 1.009 IN
yt t 1 0.181 -0.442 -0.115 0.194 IN -0.238 0.062 0.354 IN
rt 1 -0.091 -0.328 -0.056 0.189 IN -0.422 -0.148 0.101 IN
yt 1 0.012 -0.012 0.011 0.042 IN -0.013 0.020 0.057 IN
t t 1 0.764 0.581 0.724 0.848 IN 0.561 0.726 0.869 IN
rt 1 -0.068 -0.133 -0.024 0.085 IN -0.149 -0.034 0.078 IN
yt 1 -0.003 -0.008 0.007 0.026 IN -0.004 0.015 0.039 IN
rt t 1 0.142 0.064 0.162 0.256 IN 0.027 0.109 0.195 IN
rt 1 0.893 0.812 0.877 0.938 IN 0.796 0.873 0.935 IN
yt 0.528 0.900 1.136 1.425 OUT 0.785 1.015 1.291 OUT
S. D. t 0.187 0.153 0.210 0.268 IN 0.124 0.190 0.266 IN
rt 0.052 0.050 0.067 0.087 IN 0.044 0.059 0.074 IN
Dynamics Wald(9) 5.158 3.996
(coe¢cients) P-Value 0.8203 0.9117
Volatility Wald(3) 15.220 10.046
(standard deviations) P-Value 0.0016 0.0182
Total Wald(12) 19.61 13.85
(dynamics and volatility) P-Value 0.0749 0.3105
Table 3: Auxilliary VAR(1) Coe¢cients and Shock Standard Deviations
20
Parameter Meaning NK Priors HY Priors NK II Estimates HY II Estimates
 Share of capital in production 0.3 0.175 0.110 0.117
h External habit formation 0.7 0.766 0.352 0.329
p Degree of price indexation 0.5 0.438 0.258 0.234
w Degree of wage indexation 0.5 0.694 0.769 0.340
p Degree of price stickiness 0.5 0.575 0.585 0.679
w Degree of wage stickiness 0.5 0.702 0.301 0.301
p Price mark-up MA coe¢cient 0.5 0.368 0.997 0.138
w Wage mark-up MA coe¢cient 0.5 0.999 0.093 0.056
' Elasticity of capital adj. cost 4 4.602 6.447 6.132
 1+share of xed cost 1.25 2.243 1.902 1.721
 Elasticity of capital utilization 0.5 0.566 0.771 0.411
 TR coe¤. (r smoothing) 0.75 0.657 0.782 0.776
a AR coe¤. 0.5 0.760 0.847 0.840
b AR coe¤. 0.5 0.770 0.776 0.855
ga MA coe¤. of "
g
t 0.5 0.944 0.999 0.998
g AR coe¤. 0.5 0.140 0.113 0.061
i AR coe¤. 0.5 0.805 0.941 0.998
p AR coe¤. 0.5 0.611 0.746 0.518
r AR coe¤. 0.5 0.762 0.638 0.364
w AR coe¤. 0.5 0.586 0.601 0.514
ry TR coe¤. 0.12 0.586 0.201 0.209
r TR coe¤. 1.5 1.001 1.712 1.001
ry TR coe¤. 0.12 0.165 0.320 0.340
c Elasticity of substitution C 1.5 2.121 2.236 2.163
l Elasticity of substitution L 2 2.618 3.999 4.000
!p NK share in price setting 1 0.5 1 0.131
!w NK share in wage setting 1 0.5 1 0.877
Table 4: Estimation Results of NK and Hybrid Models using II Approach
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Figure 7: Structural Shocks of the Two Models
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Figure 8: Innovations of the Two Models
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3.3 Comparing Bayesian, ML and II Estimates
of the Models
Table 5 comprehensively compares estimates of the two models by the variety
of methods we are examining once we have abandoned the original priors, both
sets of which we have seen are controversial and can prejudice our ndings. In
the two left hand columns we nd the II estimates; in the next two we nd
the Bayesian estimates using these II estimates as priors. As we would expect
these are hardly di¤erent from the II estimates that discipline the Bayesian
process. However what may come as a surprise is the di¤erence that is made
by moving to FIML (Bayesian ML under at priors) in columns 3 and 6 for
NK and HY respectively (here we evaluate the likelihood on only the three key
variables we used for II, so as to compare like with like); we know that FIML is
asymptotically equivalent to IIboth are consistent and asymptotically normal.
In small samples however it makes a di¤erence which estimator is used as they
have di¤erent objective functions. Furthermore, if one uses the ML estimates
and tests them by II, they are strongly rejected- see the Wald values at the
bottom of the Table.
Le et al (2012) found that Likelihood and Wald distributions were not at all
correlated for the same true model; and as we see here the ML and II estimates
di¤er too. Researchers need to decide whether their interest in model perfor-
mance lies in it forecasting the data well or matching the data features well.
Viewed as tests of specication the Wald is far more powerful; here we take
the view we want a model that is as well specied as possible for use in policy
analysis and hence we adopt the II estimates. (Those wishing to use models for
forecasting would no doubt take a di¤erent view.)
4 Using the Model to Understand the Workings
of the Chinese Economy
In our examination of Chinese macro behaviour we use the II estimates as our
preferred ones since we know that these are not rejected by our most powerful
test, viz the II test; we also know that they t the data behaviour which wish to
match for any policy discussion that might be based on the model. If we turn
to these estimates in Table 5, essentially the di¤erence between the two models,
as reviewed above, is that under HY there is less nominal price rigidity than in
NK but roughly the same nominal wage rigidity. HY thus remains close to New
Keynesian in the labour market- reecting the high degree of organisation and
control via company unions perhaps, of the wage-setting process. Nevertheless
even here there is a non-negligible competitive share (of 12%) and also the
degree of indexation in wage ination is halved to a share of 0.34, implying
that wages are less inherently persistent than assumed in the NK prior. In the
product market HY implies a high degree of price competition (with a weight of
around 87% on the competitive sector); this is consistent with the substantial
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Model NK NK NK HY HY HY
Method II Bayes ML II Bayes ML
Prior NA II Est. Flat NA II Est. Flat
 0.110 0.134 0.534 0.117 0.018 0.044
h 0.352 0.299 0.311 0.329 0.247 0.412
p 0.258 0.268 0.519 0.234 0.172 0.593
w 0.769 0.777 0.751 0.340 0.295 0.243
p 0.585 0.622 0.678 0.679 0.664 0.786
w 0.301 0.380 0.444 0.301 0.384 0.654
p 0.997 0.999 0.300 0.138 0.082 0.513
w 0.093 0.093 0.471 0.056 0.057 0.492
' 6.447 6.577 6.183 6.132 5.816 7.454
 1.902 2.271 1.329 1.721 2.101 2.512
 0.771 0.758 0.638 0.411 0.429 0.533
 0.782 0.803 0.411 0.776 0.788 0.064
a 0.847 0.966 0.815 0.840 0.974 0.849
b 0.776 0.799 0.571 0.855 0.824 0.437
ga 1.000 0.998 0.521 0.998 0.999 0.473
g 0.113 0.112 0.523 0.061 0.060 0.845
i 0.941 0.938 0.303 0.998 0.998 0.037
p 0.746 0.786 0.730 0.518 0.785 0.748
r 0.638 0.628 0.750 0.364 0.571 0.751
w 0.601 0.881 0.625 0.514 0.923 0.673
ry 0.201 0.230 0.384 0.209 0.264 0.559
r 1.712 1.528 1.102 1.001 1.152 1.088
ry 0.320 0.374 0.456 0.340 0.352 0.453
c 2.236 2.266 1.016 2.163 2.225 1.795
l 3.999 3.825 2.810 4.000 3.813 1.184
!p 1 1 1 0.131 0.131 0.195
!w 1 1 1 0.877 0.878 0.150
a 0.658 0.377 0.110 0.622 0.419 2.488
b 1.513 0.651 0.273 0.768 0.554 0.474
g 0.513 0.937 0.039 0.462 0.882 0.091
i 0.223 0.422 0.646 0.218 0.829 0.660
r 0.093 0.202 0.201 0.091 0.196 0.050
p 0.346 0.298 0.163 0.079 0.079 0.187
w 0.429 0.415 0.409 0.441 0.516 2.448
Wald (Total) 19.61 39.01 78.96 13.85 47.93 75.79
P-Value 0.0748 0.0001 0.0000 0.3104 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5: Estimation Results of NK and Hybrid Models
25
deregulation of product pricing and markets that has occurred since the 1978
reforms. HY otherwise di¤ers from NK mainly because capacity utilisation
responds strongly to the marginal user cost of capital ( is lower implying
that existing capacity can be brought back into use cheaply so that the output
supply curve is atter); this in turn dampens the response of the user costs
of capital to shocks to that investment responds less. In addition the Taylor
Rule is much less responsive to ination (the coe¢cient is only just above unity,
the value assigned by the Taylor Principle). Thus overall HY embodies a more
exible model than NK; output reacts quickly to shocks, dampening investment
responses, and prices react little to shocks.
Our models here are ones in which money and banking is not included ex-
plicitly and hence it might be considered inadequate to analyse recent develop-
ments in China, since the nancial crisis. However, in other recent work (Le et
al, 2014) where monetary factors are included, it has been found that banking
and monetary shocks were not big contributors to the crisis in China; in par-
ticular China has never su¤ered from the zero bound. Instead the main shocks
came from external demand and internal policy responses, boosting government
spending and (largely government-controlled) investment. While the investment
response was mediated through bank lending, this was done under government
direction through state-owned banks; hence it was in essence no di¤erent from
government-mandated investment on public account. This will no doubt change
as the current reform programme to liberalise the nancial sector is rolled out;
but this remains in the future.
In this section we discuss the two models behaviour in the form of key
impulse response functions: two in particular- for a productivity and for a mon-
etary shock (all others can be found in the appendix).
When productivity rises, employment falls in both models because demand
for labour is determined by output demand as well as real wages- which fall
due to the Calvo forward-looking wage setting equation. Consumption and
investment both rise. In the HY version they rise less rst because investment
responds less as explained above; secondly because ination only falls a little,
being largely determined in the competitive sector by current marginal costs-
hence interest rates also fall by only a little, disturbing demand less.
When we turn to the monetary shock, driving up interest rates, the response
of the HY model is qualitatively similar to NK but again smaller. Investment
reacts less again. The shock has lower persistence in the HY model also.
In the appendix we show the other IRFs and we see throughout the way
in which our three key mechanisms identied above dampen the HY responses
compared with NK. Thus our careful estimation process has found that Chinas
relative exibility compared with the NK stereotype gives it a greater ability to
absorb shocks.
Table 6 below shows the variance decomposition for all 7 variables. Both
models are dominated by three shocks: productivity, consumption and invest-
ment. Productivity is the main supply shock but investment is another one: in
this we see the Chinese planning process delivering infrastructure and industrial
investment via both public borrowing and the state banking system. The con-
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Figure 9: IRFs of Productivity Shock (a)
sumption shock can be seen as a consumer credit premium e¤ect coming via
the rates charged to private borrowers by Chinese state banks- in e¤ect these
loans are mediated through a shadow banking system whereby wealth funds
coordinated by high-wealth individuals borrow o¢cially from state banks and
lend the money on to private borrowers. The pattern across the two models is
not hugely di¤erent. We can see that the Taylor Rule has a smaller e¤ect on
ination in HY as we would expect both from its smaller ination response and
from the smaller response of ination to shocks. Also price and wage shocks
largely disappear from the HY model, even on wages and prices. The consump-
tion/premium shock has generally smaller e¤ects in HY which derives from its
much smaller variance as explained earlier; it has a more dominating e¤ect on
ination but this is relative to a lower ination variance in the HY model.
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Figure 10: IRFs of Monetary Shock (r)
Model-Shock Symbol y c i l  w r
NK: Productivity a 25.86 14.17 19.74 15.18 7.94 2.9 10.59
Consumption b 45.13 54.11 6.63 67.07 49.04 64.68 75.52
Government g 3.38 0.13 0.02 5.88 0.04 0.45 0.25
Investment i 20.71 27.36 71.16 5.42 7.37 10.14 8.47
Taylor Rule r 3.16 2.25 1.97 3.56 30.32 13.11 4.05
Prices p 0.26 0.38 0.11 0.76 2.35 6.16 0.52
Wages w 1.5 1.59 0.37 2.14 2.94 2.56 0.59
HY: Productivity a 13.68 1.99 9.19 18.21 5.7 0.64 9.95
Consumption b 33.46 12.67 15.32 68.89 66.57 15.51 78.63
Government g 2.46 0.04 0.01 5.12 0.01 0.12 0.43
Investment i 49.72 85.03 75.25 6.36 13.41 81.63 7.19
Taylor Rule r 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.21 12.71 0.29 1.08
Prices p 0.01 0 0.01 0.04 0.94 1.56 0.12
Wages w 0.55 0.23 0.17 1.17 0.65 0.25 2.6
Table 6: Variance Decomposition of the Two Models under II
28
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have used the available toolkit for testing macro models to
evaluate a model of China over the period from Deng Xiaopings reforms up
until the crisis period. The model, which is derived from the work of Christiano
et al and Smets and Wouters, treats China as a closed economy, just as their
original models treated the US. However, this has not appeared to be a problem
since the model passes stringent tests of t to the available stylised facts as
summarised by a VAR. Bayesian ranking methods can be applied to China but
rely on the availability of strong priors since the ranking is heavily inuenced
by these priors; yet there is controversy about them, particularly with regard
to the degree of price/wage rigidity. When the models including their priors
are tested by Likelihood or Indirect Inference methods, models that assume
New Keynesian priors with universal imperfect competition and Calvo rigidity
are rejected in favour of models with a fair-sized perfectly competitive sector,
particularly in the product market. The model that ts best on both Likelihood
and Indirect Inference criteria is one in which the product market is over 80%
competitive but the labour market is over 80% imperfectly competititive and
governed by Calvo contracts with a modest degree of indexation. This model
behaves quite a lot more exibly than a New Keynesian, as witnessed by its
smaller reactions to shocks.
At the same time as trying to discover the nature of the Chinese economy
and specically its degree of nominal rigidity, we have been concerned to illus-
trate the problems that can be encountered in evaluating macro models. We
have shown that in estimating the model much hangs on the method used: the
criteria used in ML and II di¤er and this matters in small samples. Strong priors
can be used to force the two together; but the priors chosen for macro models
may well be, as here, highly controversial. Bayesian estimation is therefore inap-
propriately biased by such priors. Researchers that wish to nd a model capable
for reliable use in policy evaluation should use II to estimate and test the model
as this method generates the most powerful tests against mis-specication. Re-
searchers wishing to nd a model capable of forecasting accurately should use
ML which e¤ectively measures the forecasting accuracy of the model; neverthe-
less we found here that the ML-estimated models were rejected as mis-specied
by the II test and so should not be used for policy evaluation.
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6 Appendix 1: Impulse Response Functions
IRFs of Preference Shock (b)
IRFs of Expenditure Shock (g)
32
IRFs of Investment Shock (i)
IRFs of Price Mark-Up Shock (p)
33
IRFs of Wage Mark-Up Shock (w)
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7 Appendix 2: Did China Use a Forward-looking
Taylor Rule?
Since Clarida et al (1998, 2000), the forward-looking Taylor rule has attracted
increasing attention, on the grounds that in major developed economies, includ-
ing the US, Japan, the UK and the euro-zone, central banks tend to respond
to anticipated ination as opposed to lagged or current ination. The forward-
looking Taylor rule would be expressed in this model as:
rt = rt 1+(1  ) (rEt [t+k] + ryEt [yt+k])+ry (Et [yt+k]  Et [yt+k 1])+"
r
t
where k is the expectations policy horizon4 . We re-estimate both the NK
and the HY models on this alternative rule. It turns out that both models
are rejected, though HY still outperforms NK relatively (see the table below,
where p-values in the brackets indicate the probability of the null hypothesisthe
modelbeing true).
Standard Taylor Rule Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
NK 19.61 (7.48%) 39.47 (0.01%)
HY 13.85 (31.04%) 26.55 (0.90%)
It seems clear from these results that the Chinese central bank uses cur-
rent and lagged data in making monetary policy; this is perhaps not surprising
given the di¢culties in making forecasts in conditions of more or less permanent
transition and reform. Recent policy moves suggest this may well still be the
case. The central bank (Peoples Bank of China) has lowered interest rates three
times so far in 2015 (28/02/2015, 10/05/2015 and 27/06/2015) in response to
evidence of deation, even though this could have been forecast fairly easily
from the large drops in oil and other commodity prices a year or more ago.
4
k is set at 8 quarters, in line with the usual central bank practice of looking two years
ahead.
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